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ABSTRACT 
The state of Maryland, in collaboration with the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid, developed the first all-payer system 
model in the U.S. in 1971, and later in response to financial 
pressures, modernized this program to improve overall per 
capita expenditure, quality of care, and the outcome of 
Marylanders’ health. 
 
We note positive change in moving its healthcare delivery 
model from volume-driven care to value-driven coordinated 
care: Maryland hospitals have changed their mindsets to 
achieve cost reduction, health improvement, and quality of 
care improvement for the state of Maryland. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, Maryland and Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
(CMS) jointly announced the modernization of the state’s 40 
year old all-payer system into a new system focusing on 
overall per capita expenditure, quality of care, and outcomes 
of Marylanders’ health. Reinhardt (2011) defines an all-
payer system as one in which all payers pay the same price 
for the same service. Although versions of all payer systems 
had been attempted in Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and New York, by 2012 Maryland was the only state 
continuing to operate such a system (Murray, 2012). 
 
Maryland’s Original All Payer System  
Maryland’s all-payer hospital reimbursement model shifted 
financial incentives to reward results instead of volume, with 
the goal of achieving healthier communities while 
simultaneously slowing spending growth. CMS waived its 
right to set Maryland hospital Medicare rates for five years 
in return for Maryland’s commitment to keep hospital 
inpatient costs below the national average. The agreement 
covered Medicare hospital inpatient care and costs per visit 
only (PCC, 2014) for all payers: governmental, commercial, 
and self-pay (HDHMH, 2013). 
 
Because Maryland’s system applied only to hospital rate 
setting, it is technically a “modified” all payer system, a 
detail virtually always ignored and Maryland’s system is 
commonly referred to as an “all payer” system, a convention 
used throughout this paper. The prices were determined by a 
government regulated agency, the Health Services Cost 
Review Commission (HSCRC), which established rates for 
each unit of service for each hospital (MHA, 2015a). The 
rate is set differently for each hospital, depending on criteria 
such as number of patients admitted with health insurance; 
e.g., in 2015, the price of a vaginal delivery in Adventist 
Health Care Shady Grove Medical Center in Maryland was 
set to $5,466 (MHCC, 2015a), while the price for the same 
service delivered at Johns Hopkins Hospital was $13, 137 
(MHCC, 2015b). 
 
Maryland’s all payer system was developed by the Maryland 
legislature to allow State government to regulate and set 
prices of acute care hospital services across the state 
(Murray, 2009).  Maryland and the United States had 
experienced increasing costs of hospital cares after the 
creation of Medicare and Medicaid: in the U.S., hospital care 
accounted for 5.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and $108 billion (measured in 2002 dollars) of health care 
spending in 1960, and these figures rose to 15 % of GDP and 
$1.6 trillion in 2002 (Goldman and McGlynn, 2005); during 
this period, Maryland’s hospitals providing services for the 
uninsured were facing insolvency (Murray, 2009).  In 1977, 
HSCRC successfully negotiated with CMS to participate in a 
modified all payer system which would cover only hospitals 
(CMS, 2015).  
 
In order to allow Maryland to develop its initial all payer 
system, CMS required the cumulative growth payment of 
Maryland’s Medicare spending per discharge after 1981 to 
be less than the U.S average (Colmers, 2014).  
Consequently, Maryland’s goals in the development of its 
original all payer system were to constrain hospital’s cost 
inflation, ensure hospitals’ financial stability by providing 
predictable payment system, to preventing cost shifting, 
increase access to health care for Maryland’s citizens, and 
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increase the equity and fairness of hospital financing 
(Murray, 2009). Unfortunately, modernization of 
Maryland’s original all payer system became necessary 
when many Maryland hospitals faced insolvency and its 
Medicare waver was in jeopardy. 
 
Modernized All Payer System 
According to HSCRC (2014), effective January 1, 2014, 
Maryland and CMS reached an agreement to modify its 
existing all payer model for hospital services payment. This 
revision was necessary because the hospital admission rate 
in Maryland had increased substantially, causing increases in 
overall hospital spending (Anderson and Herring, 2015). 
MHA (2015b) stated that with the modernized all payer 
system, Maryland would focus on reducing costs, improving 
the health of the population of Maryland, and improving 
quality of care, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s 
Triple Aim (IHI, 2016).  
 
In the modernized all payer model, HSCRC would still set 
prices for inpatient hospital services, but Maryland hospitals 
would be required to adopt a Global Budget Revenue (GBR) 
reimbursement by 2017 (PCC, 2014).  According to HSCRC 
(2013), the GBR system was a revenue constraint as well as 
a quality improvement method. Under the GBR system, each 
hospital would receive an approved regulated revenue each 
year and be required to operate within the budget. The 
volume of care would not affect the revenue determination, 
which discouraged hospitals from increasing admissions in 
order to increase revenue.  
 
Along with GBR, Maryland agreed to improving quality of 
care by reducing potentially preventable conditions; e.g., the 
30 day hospital re-admission rate was required to be below 
the national average and the hospital-acquired infection rate 
was to be reduced by 30% by 2018 (HSCRC, 2014a), in 
addition, Maryland was to save $330 million in Medicare 
spending by the end of fiscal year 2018 (CMS, 2014). 
Consequently, Maryland set a cap limit of 3.58% on annual 
total hospital cost growth in the first 3 years by 2017. 
Maryland and CMS agreed that if Maryland did not 
accomplish the targeted goals by fiscal year 2018, it would 
resume its prior all-payer system (CMS, 2014).   
 
2  RESULTS 
Original Version All Payer System Results 
Achievements of Original All Payer System 
Major accomplishments of Maryland’s original all payer 
model were: elimination of cost-shifting, lowered costs for 
all payers, limitation of the growth of hospital per admission 
cost, provision of stable and predictable income for 
hospitals, promotion of financial stability for efficient and 
effective hospitals and removal of the inequality in the 
burden of uncompensated care (Colmers and Sharfstein, 
2013; MDHMH, 2013). Because Maryland eliminated cost 
shifting, hospital bills in Maryland were much lower than 
any other states; e.g., the average cost of hospital charges for 
a joint replacement for a Medicare patient in 2013 varied 
from $88,238 in California to $21,230 in Maryland (Cauchi 
and Valverde, 2013). Also, Maryland’s hospitals’ markups 
of price over cost became the lowest in the nation: in 1980 
the national average markup of hospital charges in the US 
was less than 25% and Maryland was slightly lower than 
national average; by 2009 national average of markup of 
hospital charges have increased to over 200% while 
Maryland’s markups remained essentially unchanged from 
1980 (Murray, 2014).  
 
Between 1976 to 2009, Maryland’s health care cost growth 
was the lowest in the U.S. (Foreman, 2014).  In 1976 the 
amount spent on patient care in Maryland hospitals was 25% 
higher than the national average; by 2009 it was 4% below 
the national average (MHA, 2013). Maryland achieved an 
estimated savings of over $40 billion between 1976 and 
2007 (Pohl, 2012). 
  
Limitations of Original All Payer System 
There were, however, “storm clouds on the horizon.” 
Limitations of the original version of Maryland’s all payer 
system included the continuing underlying incentives of fee-
for-services per admission per case for hospitals, outdated 
measurement to evaluate efficiency of care and a lack of 
incentives to improve population health and coordination of 
care (Colmers, 2015; Colmers and Sharfstein, 2013; 
National Health Policy Forum, 2014).  
 
The hospital admission rate in Maryland tripled, from 0.8% 
between 1990 and 2000 to 2.4% between 2001 and 2008 
(Kalman et al., 2014). Largely due to this increase in 
hospital admission rate, from 2013-2014 the waiver test 
(which measured relative difference between national 
average and Maryland’s Medicare inpatient spending) 
decreased more than half, and the prediction was that within 
a few years Maryland’s Medicare inpatient spending and 
national average would be the same or higher (Colmers and 
Sharfstein, 2013; PCC, 2014).  
 
By 2013, the financial status of Maryland hospitals had 
declined due to HSCRC’s tight rate settings of services; in 
2013 Maryland hospitals averaged only a 0.8% aggregated 
operating margin, very close to the break-even point (MHA, 
2013). More alarming, the percentage of Maryland hospitals 
reporting losses was 42%, with 25 out of 60 hospitals in 
Maryland having negative operating margins.  
 
In the original all payer system, Maryland and CMS did not 
set a quality measure for Medicare waiver testing; this 
resulted in declining quality of care as reflected by a high 
hospital re-admission rate. Subsequently, Maryland 
implemented new benchmarks for the quality of care in the 
all-payer system (Kastor and Adashi, 2011); e.g., a pay per 
performance program was introduced and it successfully 
reduced the hospital acquired conditions by 15% over a span 
of two years (Calikoglu, Murray and Feeney, 2012). 
 
Modernized All Payer System: Early Results 
The per capita annual revenue growth of Maryland hospitals 
rose slightly from 1.5% in 2014 to 1.8% in 2015 (HSCRC, 
2015). Also, Maryland’s goal to move 80% of hospitals to 
GBR was exceeded: all 46 hospitals in Maryland changed to 
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GBR the first year (HSCRC, 2014).  Further, hospitals’ 
operation margins improved from 2.9% to 4.8% between 
2014 and 2015. In addition, the growth of Medicare 
spending per beneficiary was 1.5% below national growth 
projection in 2014 (HSCRC, 2015). 
 
Quality improvements have proved more challenging.  One 
goal was for hospitals to reduce their all-payer adjusted 
readmission rate by 6.76% between calendar year 2013 and 
calendar 2014, but only 15 of 46 Maryland hospitals met this 
goal. As a result, the overall all payer risk adjusted 
readmission rate decreased only slightly between 2013 and 
2014. Because achieving this readmission rate decrease has 
proved difficult, the amount of revenue at risk for hospital 
performance was quadrupled from 0.5% in 2016 to 2.0% in 
2017 and hospitals that met this target received a one-time 
reward of up to 0.5% of their permanent inpatient revenue 
(HSCRC, 2015). 
 
3  DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the study was to examine the original and 
modernized Maryland all payer systems, and determine the 
efficiency and sustainability of the modernized all payer 
system. The literature review revealed achievements and 
limitations of original all payer system and noted why 
Maryland had to modernize its all payer system.   
 
Accomplishments of the original all payer system were 
substantial: elimination of cost shifting, lowering of health 
care cost, reduction of markups, provision of equal access 
for all Marylanders regardless of health insurance while 
yielding Maryland hospitals relief from the burden of 
uncompensated care. Limitations of the original all payer 
system were also found: lack of strong measures to constrain 
overall cost of health care and no incentives for 
measurement of quality of care. Eventually the original all 
payer model became unable to achieve the goals of 
improving patient care, quality of care and cost of care.  
 
The modernized all payer system was developed to 
overcome weakness of the prior all payer system: Maryland 
added strategies to achieve the improvement of population 
health, provide quality care and better  patient experiences 
and to better control cost of health care. We note the 
potential efficiency and sustainability of the new modernized 
all-payer version with GBR, which has limited hospital per 
capita growth and encouraged and rewarded hospitals to be 
responsible in improving health status of the population. The 
modernized all payer system has been moving its health care 
delivery model from volume-driven care to value-driven 
coordinated care. Maryland hospitals have changed their 
business model and become more accountable to provision 
of quality care while achieving cost containment.  
 
Miller (2009) argued that better health care systems should 
move away from volume-driven care to value-driven care 
and should develop better payment systems including 
benefits of both fee for service and capitation payment. He 
also emphasized that changing payment processes was not 
enough, but providers needed to change their mindsets, 
organizational structure, and business model to provide 
better care. Maryland’s hospitals and health care provides 
have been working on changing organizational structure, 
business model, and mind sets in order to achieve Triple 
Aim; thus the new model has shown potential efficiency. As 
for sustainability, only time will tell. 
 
The original Maryland all payer system, while successful, 
ultimately was not sustainable. The modernized all payer 
system appears to exhibit more efficiency and potential 
financial feasibility than the state’s original all payer model.  
Other states can try to implement an all payer system in 
order to provide health care on a more equitable basis to 
their citizens. If the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
modernized Maryland all payer model can be demonstrated, 
more widespread implementation of this (or a similar) model 
may be appropriate, although the feasibility of this is 
unclear. Interestingly, individuals most familiar with 
Maryland’s modified all payer program appear to be 
unconcerned with its generalizability (Berenson, 2015), 
while others (e.g., Coyle, 2015) are more positive regarding 
their state’s adoption of at least part of the modified 
Maryland model. However, the modernized model does 
require hospitals and business people to change their 
mindset to be responsible in providing health care all 
citizens, resolving social issues such as poverty and unequal 
access to health care to certain population, and achieving the 
triple aim.  
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